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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Respondent commenced this action seeking to renew three old
judgments on which the eight year statute of limitations had run.
Subsequent to the entry of those judgments, the Appellant moved to the
State of Wyoming.

Respondent contends that the statute of limitations

on the judgments was tolled during Appellant's absence from the State
of Utah.

Appellant contends that the statute does not toll by the absence

of the judgment debtor from the state on a judgment duly entered.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court found that in Civil Number 4472 in Uintah County
judgments were entered on June 30, 1964; October 6, 1964, and December
22, 1964.

This action was commenced on April 7, 1975.

The court found

the statute was tolled and granted judgment for the plaintiff on a new cause
of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this court reverse the judgment and
findings of the trial court as a matter of law.

Appellant contends that

Plaintiff-Respondent did nothing to renew the judgments during the eight
year period, and Defendant-Appellant's absence from the state did not toll
the statute of limitations.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Lile Hunting, and the Respondent, Vero 0. Hunting (Gass~
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The rules provide for the judgment creditor to execute during the
eight year period and also provides for the renewing of a judgment.
Clearly, this was not done during the eight year period from the entry of
the judgments in Case No. 4472.
Respondent did not at any time docket the judgments in Wyoming
and try to enforce them when she could have executed upon her judgments.
With due diligence she could have located the Appellant during the statutory
eight year period.

Further ... pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

Respondent could have renewed the judgments by filing a complaint during
the eight year period and completing service by publication or otherwise
as provided by Rule 4, even though she did not have Appellant's Wyoming
address for personal service.
Many courts, including the utah Supreme Court, have held that
the debtors absence from the state after the rendition of the judgment or
the accrual of the cause of action thereon does not suspend or toll the
period of limitations.

Sweetser v. Fox, 43 U40, 134 P599 (1911);

U. S. v. Willhite, 219 F 2d 843, 849, In the Matter of Neil S. MacKay,
416 P 2d 823, 849 (1966); 2 ALR 3d 1385.
Another utah case dealing with the subject is Youngdale v. Burton
102 ut. 169, 128 P 2d 1053 (1942).

The facts of this case are that in June

of 1931, a party obtafned a judgment for money against plaintiff.

Eight

years later the period of limitations expired on the judgment and became
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barred.

In 1941, the judgment-creditor filed in the Salt Lake City Court

praying for execution on the dormant judgment, which was granted.

The

decision was appeal, and in reversing the decision of the City Court, the
Supreme Court of Utah unanimously held that the eight year period of
limitation was final.

The court stated that:

"A money judgment forms the basis for but two legal
proceedings: (a) A suit thereon, brought within eight
years, wherein it forms the basis or chose in action
for a new judgment, or (b) Some form of proceedings
in execution for collection. "
Respondent admits that no attempt to renew her judgments was
made during the eight year period from the date of their entry.
The most recent Utah determination on the issue of barred judgments deals with an attempt by the plaintiff to renew and revive a judgment
eight years and five months after the date of its entry.

In Yergensen v.

Ford, 16 Ut. 2d 397, 402 P. 2d 696 (1965), it is reported that the original
judgment was rendered in 1949 in an action upon three promissory notes.
Thereafter the judgment-debtors agreed to satisfy the judgment, but it
wasn't until 1958 that any further action occurred by the plaintiff, at
which time suit was instituted in the Fourth Judicial District (Judge
Tuckett presiding).

The case was dismissed on the basis of U. C. A.

78-12-22, which states that:
"Within eight years: An action upon a judgment or decree
of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory
within the United States. "
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causes of action to judgment.

Having reduced those causes of action to

judgment, she was then bound by the eight year statute of limitations
under U. C. A. 78-12-22 (1953).

Her failure to take any action to renew

those judgments during the eight year period now precludes her from recovery.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred as a matter of law in granting recovery to
the Respondent.

Respondent had ample opportunity to renew the judgments

during the eight year period of their entry whether or not she knew the
address of the Appellant.

She failed to do anything to preserve the judgments.

Appellant respectfully submits that the decision of the lower court
should be reversed.

e<pedfully~

John C. Beaslin
Attorney for Appellant
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